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ROLL THE DICE, RATIONAL AGENT: SHOULD EXTRA-
CURIAL PUNISHMENT MITIGATE AN OFFENDER’S 
SENTENCE? 
 
JAMES DUFFY* 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
It was rugby league State of Origin night 2008 and a group of adults had 
descended upon a house in Eagleby, Brisbane to have some drinks and to celebrate the 
game. At 11pm that evening, Shane Thomas Davidson entered the bedroom of the 
homeowner’s 10-year-old son, TC. Davidson approached the bed and began to 
massage the boy’s penis under his clothing, which caused TC to wake. Davidson 
stated, ‘Show me how big your willy is and I’ll show you how big mine is’. TC refused 
the request and after a small period of time, left the bedroom and told his father what 
had happened. 
On hearing this turn of events, the father, BC, dragged Davidson outside the 
house and onto the driveway. He threw Davidson onto the ground and kicked him 
numerous times in the head. Throughout the incident, BC called out to his wife to bring 
him a knife. BC admitted that his intention was to castrate Davidson. His wife refused 
to intervene.  
As a result of the assault, Davidson needed surgery to reconstruct his face. At the 
time of sentencing evidence was led that Davidson had ‘suffered a closed head injury 
resulting in cognitive deficits and chronic post-traumatic headaches’.1 Davidson was 
forced to sell his boat repair business of 14 years and was left with permanent facial 
injuries. In his Honour’s sentencing remarks, Dearden DCJ took account of the 
significant injuries that Davidson had received at the hands of the victim’s father. 
These injuries were treated as a mitigating factor and Davidson’s sentence was 
reduced. Instead of facing a period of incarceration, Davidson was sentenced to a nine-
month intensive correction order. 
The matter was the subject of an Attorney-General’s appeal against sentence and 
was heard by the Queensland Court of Appeal.2 In an ex tempore judgment delivered 
by Holmes JA (Keane and Chesterman JJA concurring) her Honour dismissed the 
appeal. Whilst acknowledging that the sexual abuse of children would ordinarily result 
in detention in custody, it was held that Davidson’s suffering and lasting disability 
combined with his economic loss represented ‘exceptional circumstances’. Her Honour 
stated that had it not been for these factors ‘the result might have been something in the 
order of a sentence of nine months imprisonment, with release after three months’.3  
R v Davidson is not the first example of a case in which injury to an offender has 
resulted in a reduction in sentence. This article will explore whether extra-curial 
punishment should be regarded as a factor that can mitigate the sentence of an 
offender. It will be argued that the current theoretical rationales (retribution and 
                                                 
* BCom/LLB (Hons)(UQ), LLM (QUT), Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology Law 
School. james.duffy@qut.edu.au. The author would like to thank Nigel Stobbs for feedback on 
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1 R v Davidson (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Dearden DCJ, 15 June 2009), [15]. 
2 R v Davidson; ex-parte A-G (Qld) [2009] QCA 283. 
3 Ibid 5. 
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deterrence) used to justify the acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment are 
problematic. It will further be suggested that the recognition of extra-curial punishment 
erodes the important symbolism involved in a court sanction. The moral issues 
stemming from the courts’ acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment will be 
canvassed, with the ultimate conclusion being drawn that extra-curial punishment 
should continue to operate as a mitigating factor upon sentence, with its theoretical 
underpinnings in need of re-examination. 
 
A  Definition 
 
Extra-curial punishment (sometimes referred to as extra-judicial punishment or 
‘natural punishment’)4 can broadly be defined as punishment inflicted upon an 
individual, which occurs outside of a court of law. Extra-curial punishment has been 
treated as a relevant mitigating factor in the sentencing of an offender, where the 
offender has suffered ‘serious loss or detriment as a result of having committed the 
offence’.5 This will be the case even when the detriment is suffered as a result of 
individuals exacting retribution or revenge for the crime committed.6 In order to 
function as a mitigating circumstance on sentence, the injuries suffered by an offender 
must be connected with the commission of the offence7 and must not be self-inflicted.8 
 
B  Legal Recognition of Extra-Curial Punishment 
                                                 
4 Andrew Ashworth (Vinerian Professor of English Law at the University of Oxford) uses the 
phrase ‘natural punishment’ as a synonym for ‘extra-curial punishment’ when considering how 
the criminal law of England and Sweden deals with offenders who have been injured during the 
commission of a crime. See Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge 
University Press, 4th ed, 2005) 174-175. 
5 R v Daetz; R v Wilson [2003] NSWCCA 216 at [62]. From the outset of this article, it is 
important to acknowledge the strong parallels between extra-curial punishment and traditional 
indigenous customary punishment. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss customary 
punishment, but as a potential area of future research it is noted that the literature on customary 
punishment would be of benefit in further analysing extra-curial punishment. Cases such as R v 
Mamakika (1982) 5 A Crim R 354, Jadurin v R (1982) 7 A Crim R 182, R v Minor (1992) 59 A 
Crim R 227, Munugurr v R (1994) 4 NTLR 63, R v Walker (unreported NT SC 10/2/1994 SCC 
No. 46 of 1993), R v Miyatatawuy (1995) 87 A Crim R 574, R v Poulson (2001) 122 A Crim R 
388 show that courts have been willing to treat customary punishment (such as shaming, exile, 
spearing etc) as a mitigating factor on sentence. As an interesting response to these cases, section 
91 of the Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth) prohibits the recognition of 
customary punishment as a mitigating factor. Section 91 states:  
‘In determining the sentence to be passed, or the order to be made, in respect of any person for 
an offence against a law of the Northern Territory, a court must not take into account any form 
of customary law or cultural practice as a reason for:  
(a) excusing, justifying, authorising, requiring or lessening the seriousness of the criminal 
behaviour to which the offence relates; or  
(b) aggravating the seriousness of the criminal behaviour to which the offence relates.’ 
6 R v Daetz; R v Wilson [2003] NSWCCA 216 at [62]. 
7 In the case of R v Silvano [2008] NSWCCA 118, a prisoner was anally raped and punched in 
the head whilst serving time for several offences, the most serious being murder. These injuries 
were not taken into account on sentence as there was nothing ‘to suggest that the injuries were 
inflicted on the applicant by the other prisoners for the purpose of punishing him for having 
committed the offences’ [34]. 
8 In Christodoulou v R [2008] NSWCCA 102, the Court held that where the offender 
deliberately injected himself with battery acid at the time of being arrested, this would not be a 
factor that mitigated sentence.  
117 
 
 
 
 
The creation and acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment as a mitigating 
factor in sentencing is rooted in the common law. Whilst all states and territories in 
Australia have enacted legislation to guide the sentencing process, no jurisdiction 
specifically lists extra-curial punishment as a circumstance of mitigation. This is not to 
say that recognition of extra-curial punishment is inconsistent with the legislation. The 
legislation in each Australian jurisdiction specifies factors that might go towards 
mitigation of sentence: 
 
Jurisdiction Legislation Section dealing with mitigating factors 
Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Section 16 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 
2005 (ACT) Section 33 
New South Wales 
Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 
(NSW) 
Section 21A 
Northern Territory Sentencing Act (NT) Section 5 
Queensland Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) Section 9 
South Australia Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) Section 10 
Tasmania Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) No relevant section 
Victoria Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) Section 5 
Western Australia Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) Section 8 
 
None of the legislative provisions that deal with mitigating factors purports to 
provide an exhaustive list of matters that will reduce sentence. It would not be practical 
(or even possible) to do so. Instead, most jurisdictions have included a ‘catch all’ style 
section that allows a court to consider any matter it wishes, as being either aggravating 
or mitigating. For example, section 9(2) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) 
states that in sentencing an offender, a court must have regard to: 
 
(g) the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the offender; and 
(r) any other relevant circumstance. 
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In R v Daetz,9 James J sitting in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal 
noted: 
 
The concept of extra-curial punishment is not expressly referred to in the present s 
21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act … However it is clear from the terms 
of the section that … the matters expressly stated do not exhaust the matters which a 
sentencing judge may properly take into account.10 
 
The purpose of acknowledging the different statutory sentencing regimes in 
Australia is to highlight the largely uniform way in which the states and territories deal 
with mitigating factors in the sentencing process. Some states have a more prescriptive 
and detailed list of sentencing considerations than others, but the recognition of extra-
curial punishment as a potentially mitigating factor on sentence is not inconsistent with 
any sentencing legislation in Australia. The discussion of extra-curial punishment in 
this article is therefore applicable to all Australian jurisdictions. 
 
 
II  THE CHALLENGE TO EXTRA-CURIAL PUNISHMENT AS A MITIGATING FACTOR 
 
Whilst extra-curial punishment is predominantly a common law creature, its 
effect as a mitigating factor on sentence is a relatively new phenomenon. The 1990s 
and early 2000s witnessed a string of cases involving offenders injured during, or soon 
after, the commission of their crimes. Judges initially grappled with the role extra-
curial punishment should play in the sentencing process and appeared unclear as to its 
theoretical underpinnings. This confusion was highlighted in the landmark case of R v 
Daetz.11 Daetz was charged with the offence of robbery in company and two counts of 
demanding money with menaces with intent to steal. In November 2002, Daetz and his 
co-offender Wilson approached two males (Cottee and Ross) with the view to 
obtaining money. Unhappy with the offer of some coins, Daetz attempted to forcibly 
steal Ross’ mobile phone. When Ross resisted, he was punched in the head several 
times and then kicked in the head repeatedly. 
Later that same evening, a group of males armed with metal poles and garden 
stakes approached Daetz and Wilson at the same location. After asking Daetz whether 
he knew Ross, the group then attacked Daetz and Wilson. Daetz was hit over his head 
with the poles and stakes and suffered ‘traumatic bilateral extradural haemorrhages and 
left cerebral contusions, skull fracture and scalp laceration’.12 
The case of Daetz is significant because the judge at first instance13 refused to 
take into account the extra-curial punishment suffered by Daetz as a mitigating factor. 
His Honour stated (in the context of examining mitigating factors) that ‘any such 
general rule allowing a mitigatory effect to revenge punishments would be potentially 
subversive of the rule of law’.14 His Honour held that Daetz had gained a deeper 
insight into the effect of his offending as a result of becoming a victim himself, and 
reduced the sentence on the basis of Daetz’s new found contrition. The sentence was 
                                                 
9 [2003] NSWCCA 216. 
10 Ibid [63]. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid [25]. 
13 His Honour Judge Woods QC, District Court New South Wales. 
14 [2003] NSWCCA 216, [26]. 
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not reduced on the basis of extra-curial punishment and his Honour made this perfectly 
clear when he stated: 
 
I do not allow any separate mitigatory effect by way of a reduction of the sentence 
which I will otherwise impose due simply to the fact that he has had his skull fractured 
in a revenge attack after he, himself, had been engaged in a violent and a vicious attack 
on a person.15 
 
The misgivings with extra-curial punishment voiced by his Honour Judge Woods 
QC in the New South Wales District Court had been echoed previously by the South 
Australian Court of Criminal Appeal. In R v Gooley16 Doyle CJ considered the effect 
of a revenge assault directed at a 23 year old offender who had unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a 14 year old woman. His Honour stated: 
 
I do not consider that ordinarily illegal acts of other people can affect the punishment 
which an offender must receive. The law must do what it can to protect the appellant, 
as must prison authorities … The conduct of the victim’s friends or family cannot 
reduce the appropriate sentence, in my opinion. To allow it to do so would be to allow 
private revenge or punishment to replace punishment by the state. 
 
The decision of Judge Woods QC in Daetz was ultimately overturned by the New 
South Wales Criminal Court of Appeal, but the criticisms of extra-curial punishment as 
a mitigating factor on sentence have never been explicitly addressed. No Australian 
court has addressed or rebutted the claim that the recognition of extra-curial 
punishment is potentially subversive of the rule of law.17 No Australian court has 
considered whether the recognition of extra-curial punishment, in substance, allows 
private revenge to replace punishment by the state. This article contends that judges 
have been too quick to acknowledge extra-curial punishment as a factor in mitigation 
without identifying the sentencing goals or purposes that such an acknowledgment 
achieves.18 It is acknowledged that the process of sentencing involves intuitive 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 (1996) 87 A Crim R 209. 
17 A V Dicey’s classical formulation of the rule of law entails ‘the absolute supremacy or 
predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power … It means equality 
before the law or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered 
by the ordinary law courts’. A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(1959) 202-203. We can only speculate what his Honour Judge Woods was implying when he 
suggested that the recognition of extra-curial punishment is potentially subversive of the rule of 
law. Given that the rule of law seeks to ensure that ‘authority is legitimately exercised only in 
accordance with written, publicly disclosed laws adopted and enforced in accordance with 
established procedural steps’, perhaps the assertion is that extra-curial punishment occurs outside 
of a court of law, without any sense of procedure and with little correlation to the punishment 
that would otherwise be ordered by a judge. 
18 Edney and Bagaric note that when ‘considering selective mitigating factors it is important to 
bear in mind their relationship to particular sentencing objectives. To do otherwise is to permit 
the task of sentencing to be independent of its theoretical rationale. It is important to bear in 
mind that the mitigating factors are directed towards reducing the culpability of the offender. 
Thus specific mitigating factors are ultimately derived from the ends or objectives of sentencing 
and must be considered as directed to securing particular sentencing ends or objectives.’ Richard 
Edney and Mirko Bagaric, Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 1st ed, 2007) 149. 
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synthesis19 and that it can be difficult to point to the effect of one particular factor on 
the final sentence. Intuitive synthesis, however, should not be proffered as a reason 
why mitigatory factors are employed, without meaningful consideration of their 
theoretical rationale. 
Bagaric and Edney note that the conventional and accrued wisdom of appellate 
courts, in combination with the professional practice of advocates, contribute to the 
identification and relevance of potential mitigating factors.20 The list of factors that 
may be considered mitigating is fluid and susceptible to challenge and change. Judicial 
reasoning, academic writing, political action and community views all impact upon the 
acceptance of certain circumstances as having a mitigatory quality. It is the communal 
acceptance of mitigating factors that gives them their relevance and persuasiveness, 
rather than any intrinsic characteristics of an accused, or the offence they have 
committed.21 
Whilst extra-curial punishment as a circumstance of mitigation has received 
appellate court approval, it is still a relatively new common law concept. If we accept 
the proposition that ‘[m]itigating factors and their particular content are not immutable 
and fixed; rather, they are the product of creative and interpretive activities of the key 
participants in the process of sentencing’, then we should also accept that extra-curial 
punishment as a mitigating factor could lose currency as quickly as it has gained 
traction. Media scrutiny22 and community disquiet over the decision of R v Davidson 
suggests that as the public becomes better informed about extra-curial punishment (and 
its potential impact upon sentencing), there will be a stronger need for the legal 
community to justify its existence as a mitigating factor upon sentence. 
 
 
III  EXTRA-CURIAL PUNISHMENT AND THE STATE AS PUNISHER 
 
Given the potential severity of extra-curial punishment and the effect it may have 
on an offender, there are still strong reasons for limiting the role of punishment solely 
to the State. Australian courts’ recognition of extra-curial punishment as a mitigating 
factor is an implicit acceptance that private vengeance meted out by individuals can, 
indirectly, form part of an offender’s sentence. The courts are sending a mixed 
message to the Australian public: while they do not condone private vengeance or 
vigilante attacks on an offender, they are still willing to acknowledge that it is a way to 
achieve a desired sentencing purpose.23 The symbolic nature of a sanction imposed by 
the State can be eroded and reduced in severity by the actions of one vengeful 
individual. When discussing the issue of sentencing purposes and the inhibition of 
private vengeance, McGarvie J in the Victorian Criminal Court of Appeal noted:  
 
[There is a] community expectation that particular offences merit substantial 
punishment. This expectation if denied brings with it a risk that community respect for 
the administration of the law will be reduced … The danger of such a situation is that 
                                                 
19 R v Markarian (2005) 215 ALR 213. 
20 Edney and Bagaric, above n 19, 150-151. 
21 Ibid 152. 
22 See for example Robyn Ironside, David Earley and Neale Maynard, ‘Molester free while dad 
who bashed him could be jailed’, The Courier Mail (online) , 18 September 2009 
<http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,25651579-952,00.html>. 
23 See in particular the discussion below concerning R v Hannigan [2009] QCA 40. 
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if the community lacks confidence in its criminal law it tends to take punishment into 
its own hands, inflicting harsh and unreasonable retribution upon offenders.24 
 
The symbolic nature of the State sentencing an offender cannot be downplayed. 
There is intrinsic value in a judicial pronouncement that reaffirms shared values and 
censures an offender.25 When an individual decides privately to seek retribution on an 
offender, it is that individual who determines the type and severity of the punishment.26 
If an offender’s sentence is mitigated on this basis, it downplays the stake that the rest 
of the community has in seeing an offender properly punished. Bagaric and Edney 
note: 
 
… criminal law punishes behaviour that is supposedly so repugnant that it is an affront 
to society as a whole, not merely to the victim. It is for this reason that the state steps 
in to conduct criminal prosecutions, rather than leaving enforcement to victims.27 
 
Individuals do not have the time, resources or sentencing options available to 
them to mete out a punishment to an offender that is fair in all the circumstances. The 
State practically and symbolically steps in to break the criminal nexus between the 
accused and the victim28 because it is in the best position to sentence an offender. 
Wilson suggests that State punishment represents the ‘social clout of the norm’.29 In 
this fashion, State imposed sanctions are a ‘symbolic stick that helps to keep the 
community in order’.30 
According to Freiberg and Moore, ‘sentencing is a process of communication, 
both to offender, victims and the public’31 and all parties have a vested interest in the 
result. The acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor on 
sentence over-emphasises the punitive punishment dispensed by a vengeful individual 
and downplays the interest that the community as a whole has in seeing an offender 
punished in an appropriate fashion. 
The symbolic role the State plays in punishing an offender is strongly interlinked 
with the sentencing aim or purpose of denunciation. Denunciation has been described 
as the ‘imposition of sanctions that are of a nature and of sufficient degree of severity 
to adequately express the public’s abhorrence of the crime for which the sanction was 
                                                 
24 R v Woolnough (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Criminal Appeal, McGarvie 
J, 4 June 1981). 
25 Richard G Fox and Arie Frieberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 1999) 215. 
26 It is important to acknowledge the dichotomous nature of private justice and public justice. It 
is not surprising that the courts are having difficulty dealing with extra-curial punishment given 
the broader rationale of criminal justice as public or state justice. Private perspectives are clearly 
significant, but are assumed to be incompatible with current sentencing doctrine. On the 
competing tensions of public and private ideals in relation to the trial and sentence of an accused, 
see Jonathan Doak ‘Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation’ (2005) 32(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 294 and Ian Edwards, ‘Victim Participation in Sentencing: The 
Problems of Incoherence’ (2001) 40(1) Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 39. 
27 Edney and Bagaric, above n 19, 13. 
28 Ibid. 
29 William Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (Hart Publishing, 2002) 45. 
30 Heather Douglas and Sue Harbidge, Criminal Process in Queensland (Law Book Company, 
2008) 233. 
31 Arie Freiberg and Victoria Moore, ‘Disbelieving Suspense: Suspended Sentences of 
Imprisonment and Public Confidence in the Criminal Justice System’ (2009) 42 The Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 101, 104. 
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imposed’.32 Denunciation is recognised as a sentencing purpose in the legislation of 
most States and Territories. By way of example, section 9(1)(d) of the Penalties and 
Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) states that a sentence may be imposed on an offender ‘to 
make it clear that the community, acting through the court, denounces the sort of 
conduct in which the offender was involved’. Section 5(1)(d) of the Sentencing Act 
1991 (Vic) requires a judicial officer ‘to manifest the denunciation by the court of the 
type of conduct in which the offender engaged’. The Victorian Sentencing Committee 
recognises the concept of denunciation as predicated 
 
… on the notion of a symbolic statement intended to convey a message that … society 
considers a particular crime as being sufficiently serious to warrant punishment [and] 
society will not tolerate the law-breaking conduct of the offender.33 
 
Denunciation has also been recognised as an important sentencing tool in the 
High Court decision of Ryan v The Queen.34 In Ryan a catholic priest was convicted of 
sexually assaulting a number of boys under the age of 16, over a period of 20 years. 
One of the issues that the High Court commented on was the contribution that 
‘denunciation’ should play in the final sentence of the offender. Kirby J remarked:35 
 
A fundamental purpose of the criminal law, and of the sentencing of convicted 
offenders, is to denounce publicly the unlawful conduct of an offender. This objective 
requires that a sentence should also communicate society’s condemnation of the 
particular offender’s conduct. The sentence represents “a symbolic, collective 
statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our 
society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law”.36 
 
In this context, it is difficult to justify extra-curial punishment as a valid form of 
punishment worthy of recognition by the courts. Extra-curial punishment is by no 
means a collective statement as to whether (or to what extent) an offender should be 
punished. At best it represents the punitive views of an individual or small group who 
decide to seek retribution upon an offender. At worst, where an offender is 
unintentionally injured through their own misadventure, the injury received does not 
reflect anybody’s view as to an appropriate punishment. ‘When a court passes 
sentence, it authorises the use of State coercion against a person for committing an 
offence’.37 The symbolic power of a sentence can only be achieved by (and through) a 
body with the time, resources, sentencing options and popular mandate to sentence 
those who have committed a crime. The only body with the symbolic power and 
collective voice to adequately sentence an offender is the court system. 
Mitigation of a sentence due to extra-curial punishment means that the social 
solidarity38 achieved through the denunciation of a crime can be weakened by the 
                                                 
32 John Tomaino, ‘Punishment Theory’ in Rick Sarre and John Tomaino (eds), Exploring 
Criminal Justice: Contemporary Australian Themes (1999) Chapter 6, 162. 
33 Victorian Sentencing Committee, Report: Sentencing, Melbourne, VGPO, 1988, 105. 
34 (2001) 206 CLR 267. 
35 Ibid [118]. 
36 R v M [1996] 1 SCR 500, 558 per Lamer CJ. 
37 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Sentencing’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford University Press, 2002) 1076, 1077. 
38 Tomaino, above n 33, 162. French Sociologist Émile Durkheim has previously explored the 
institution of punishment and its ability to promote social solidarity and moral consensus 
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behaviour of an individual or group acting under their own notions of justice. In an 
extreme example, the power of a sentence that could adequately express the 
community’s indignation and outrage over an offence could be thwarted because the 
offender is accidentally injured in the commission of a crime. 
In the case of Alameddine v R,39 the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of 
knowingly taking part in the manufacture of a prohibited drug (methylamphetamine) 
and one count of possessing a precursor (pseudoephedrine) intended for illegal 
manufacture. Alameddine was visited by his parole officer whilst serving a five month 
home detention sentence for driving offences. When the parole officer arrived at the 
applicant’s home, she believed he was under the influence of amphetamines and began 
to search the premises for drugs. This search uncovered several bags of drugs and the 
parole officer called the police. 
Whilst waiting for the police, the parole officer heard an explosion and saw a 
portable shed in the applicant’s backyard engulfed in flames. She also saw the 
applicant emerge from the shed badly burnt and bleeding. The applicant later admitted 
(confirmed by forensic testing) that the shed was used as a laboratory to manufacture 
amphetamine. As a result of his injuries the applicant was hospitalised for three 
months, was required to wear a burns suit for two years, and required ongoing visits to 
the hospital for dressings and further treatment.40  
On appeal, the applicant claimed that the sentencing judge failed to adequately 
recognise the extra-curial punishment that he had suffered – the burns and the ongoing 
treatment regime. Grove J noted that ‘the authorities concerning mitigation of 
punishment by reason of the offender having suffered non judicial punishment have 
generally dealt with situations where it was caused by external forces rather than by 
being triggered by the offender’s own actions’.41 Nevertheless, his Honour held that 
there was no ‘judicial opinion against outright rejection of the possibility of mitigation, 
even where the injury is self inflicted or induced by the activity of the offender’.42 The 
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal altered the original sentence, with the 
effect that Alameddine would be released from prison earlier than the original sentence 
anticipated. 
Groves J qualified his position in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal 
decision of Christodoulou v R.43 In Christodoulou, the applicant was charged with a 
number of offences involving intimidation and actual violence towards his direct and 
extended family. When the police arrived in response to the offending, the applicant 
deliberately impaled his arm on the needle of a syringe containing battery acid. When 
dealing with the issue of extra-curial punishment Groves J stated:  
 
It is a step beyond Alameddine … to seek to extend the availability of a mitigatory 
element to a deliberately self inflicted injury as distinguished from occasions where 
the injury was, although self inflicted and in the course of crime commission, 
unintentional. Insofar as the taking into account of extra-curial punishment may be 
                                                                                                                      
amongst a community. This theme is evident in his works The Division of Labor in Modern 
Society (1893) and Two Laws of Penal Evolution (1901). 
39 [2006] NSWCCA 317. 
40 Ibid [6]. 
41 Ibid [18]. 
42 Ibid [23]. 
43 [2008] NSWCCA 102. 
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described as a principle, there is no authority for extending it to deliberately caused 
injury and such an extension should not, in my opinion, be recognised. 44 
 
The decision in Christodoulou is logical. An offender should not have their 
sentence mitigated because they deliberately injure themselves during the commission 
of an offence. It is argued, however, that the distinction drawn between a deliberately 
self inflicted injury and an injury unintentionally suffered in the commission of a crime 
is a very fine one.45 This article suggests that it is artificial to mitigate, or not mitigate a 
sentence, based on this distinction. In Alameddine, the applicant admitted that the 
explosion in his shed (amphetamine lab) was caused by his attempt to use as much 
amphetamine as he could before he was returned to gaol.46 When an offender puts 
themselves in a deliberately dangerous situation in order to commit a crime, the courts 
should not rush to mitigate a sentence if the offender is injured. If an offender is 
willing to take the risks involved in a criminal enterprise, we should think very 
carefully about removing the ‘downside’ of those risks if the crime does not go to plan. 
It must be acknowledged that ‘there are certain collateral consequences of being 
convicted of an indictable crime that must be accepted as an integral part of the 
punishment, rather than a basis for mitigating it’.47 
This is not to suggest that extra-curial punishment has no role to play as a 
mitigating factor on sentence. Indeed, it is conceded that in circumstances where the 
injury suffered by an offender far outweighs the seriousness of the crime committed, it 
may be unjust not to take account of injuries suffered. This is exactly the point the 
Queensland Court of Appeal was attempting to make in R v Noble; R v Verheyden.48 
This article contends that there should be more than just ‘serious loss or detriment’ to 
an offender before extra-curial punishment is recognised as a mitigating factor. Courts 
need to reach a consensus as to why extra-curial punishment should mitigate an 
offender’s sentence, ideally with reference to the theoretical aims or purposes of the 
sentencing process. Extra-curial punishment is a newly recognised mitigating factor. If 
its theoretical underpinnings are not sound, there is danger in blindly acknowledging it 
without questioning its utility to the sentencing process. 
                                                 
44 R v Christodoulou [2008] NSWCCA 102, [41]-[42]. During the original sentencing hearing in 
Christodoulou, the defence counsel led evidence that the applicant: ‘has now as a consequence 
of the ingestion or the injection of that material, a substantial and permanent disability to his 
arm. His upper arm effectively has a crater in it where the acid was injected, and that is 
something that is a constant physical reminder to him of his behaviour on this day.’  
45 See for example the discussion of Kirby J in R v SS [2010] NSWSC [48]-[59], where the 
defendant was horribly burned as a result of an attempted suicide (house fire) that killed her 
partner. 
46 R v Alameddine [2006] NSWCCA 317, [4]. 
47 Richard G Fox, ‘Ryan v The Queen: Paradox and Principle in Sentencing a Paedophilic Priest: 
Ryan’s Case in the High Court’, Case Note (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 178, 
189. 
48 [1996] 1 Qd R 329. In this case, the offenders were hit by shotgun pellets during the course of 
an attempted armed robbery. The Court (comprised of Davies and Pincus JJA and Williams J) 
stated: ‘We would not accept, however, that any injury suffered in the course of committing an 
offence is necessarily a factor in sentencing. But it is easy to postulate circumstances in which an 
injury so suffered would be relevant. If an offender has assaulted another without causing 
significant injury, and the other has defended himself so vigorously as to cause the offender 
serious injury, it would ordinarily be right to treat the injury the offender has suffered as at least 
part punishment – whether or not the retaliation was within lawful bounds.’ at 331. 
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If acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor is not 
consistent with any of the theoretical aims of sentencing, we need to consider why it 
should justifiably reduce an offender’s sentence. 
 
 
IV  EXTRA-CURIAL PUNISHMENT AND THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE 
 
The 2009 Queensland Court of Appeal decision of R v Hannigan49 represents the 
most explicit attempt to provide a theoretical rationale for the acknowledgment of 
extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor. In Hannigan the applicant pleaded 
guilty to one count of dangerously operating a motor vehicle and a number of summary 
offences relating to inappropriate use of a motor vehicle. The applicant led the police 
on a chase that involved excessive speeding, running a red light and driving on the 
wrong side of the road. Ultimately a collision with a traffic sign on a median strip 
damaged the vehicle to such an extent that it came to a stop.50 Two days after the 
offending, the police learnt that the applicant had consumed four cans of mid-strength 
beer and three cans of rum before driving. He knew that he was too intoxicated to 
drive.51 
Hannigan sought leave to appeal on the basis that the original sentence was 
excessive, as it did not take into account extra-curial punishment he had received as a 
result of being assaulted by the arresting police officer. This information was not 
before the sentencing judge because the applicant, due to his intoxication, had no 
recollection of the assault. A witness to the events came forward after reading an 
account of the story in the local media. In an affidavit the witness stated:52 
 
I witnessed the police officer vigorously punching the face of the person in the utility 
and swearing at him … several times. Whilst I did not see contact between the fist of 
the police officer and the person in the utility, I did see the police officer’s elbow 
going in and out of the car from which action I formed the view that (he) was 
vigorously punching the person in the utility … he punched the person, I would say, in 
excess of 20 times in the face area and he was screaming in a hysterical manner. 
 
Chesterman JA (with whom de Jersey CJ agreed) listed evidence of the injuries 
suffered by Hannigan as a result of the assault. Photographs taken at the watch house 
after arrest showed reddened skin on the applicant’s right cheek. His right eye was 
partly closed and there had been bleeding from the right nostril, as well as broken skin 
underneath the right eye.53 
In his Honour’s judgment, Chesterman JA referred with approval to the 
requirement in R v Daetz54 that an offender suffer ‘serious loss or detriment as a result 
of having committed the offence’ before extra-curial punishment could mitigate 
sentence. His Honour held that the injuries suffered by Hannigan did not amount to 
extra-curial punishment as they were ‘minor and not serious’. Their effect went 
unnoticed and would in any event have been transient. More importantly the applicant 
did not know he had been hit.55 
                                                 
49 [2009] QCA 40. 
50 Ibid [4]. 
51 Ibid [5]. 
52 Sections of this affidavit are extracted at paragraph [10] of the judgment in R v Hannigan. 
53 Ibid [22]. 
54 (2003) 139 A Crim R 398. 
55 R v Hannigan [2009] QCA 40, [24]. 
126 
 
 
 
In obiter, Chesterman JA sought to explain the reason why extra-curial 
punishment should be viewed as a mitigating factor on sentence: 
 
In my opinion the theory which underlies the reliance of extra-curial punishment to 
sentence is that it deters an offender from re-offending by providing a reminder of the 
unhappy consequence of criminal misconduct, or it leaves the offender with a 
disability, some affliction, which is a consequence of criminal activity. In such cases 
one can see that a purpose of sentencing by the court, deterrence or retribution, has 
been partly achieved.56 
 
Commentators have suggested ‘that the disorder in sentencing law and practice … 
stems largely from the dissociation between it and theories of punishment’.57 It is for 
this reason that the judgment of Chesterman JA in Hannigan should be lauded. In 
acknowledging the previous authorities that had contemplated extra-curial punishment, 
Chesterman JA attempted to ground this mitigating factor in sentencing theory. Judges 
should not have to explain in every set of sentencing remarks how their recognition of 
certain aggravating and mitigating factors reflect the purpose or sentencing end they 
are trying to achieve. With a newly recognised mitigating factor however, this 
theoretical justification does need to occur and it does need to receive a degree of 
judicial consensus. If we accept the premise that there is nothing inherently mitigating 
(or aggravating) in most sentencing factors, extra-curial punishment could be written 
off overnight as an opportunistic defence counsel submission that wrongly gained 
traction as a sentencing factor. If the acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment is 
justifiable and consistent with the aims and purposes of sentencing, it is much more 
difficult to disregard it as a groundless (yet creative) sentencing fiction.    
 
A  Extra-Curial Punishment and the Sentencing aim of Deterrence 
 
This article suggests that there is a disconnect between extra-curial punishment as 
a mitigating factor and the sentencing theories of deterrence and retribution that 
supposedly underlie it.  
The sentencing theory of deterrence has two components with slightly different 
objectives. A sentence promoting specific deterrence seeks to dissuade the particular 
offender from reoffending. A sentence promoting general deterrence aims to prevent 
potential offenders from committing a crime in the first place. These goals can be 
achieved by making the cost of offending outweigh any benefits, or by creating a fear 
of punishment in potential offenders contemplating criminal action.58  
In Hannigan, Chesterman JA suggested that extra-curial punishment could serve 
the goal of deterrence by providing an offender with a disability or affliction which 
reminds him or her of the unhappy and dangerous consequences of criminal 
misconduct.59 Two points need to be made with respect to these comments. First, while 
his Honour makes broad reference to the sentencing aim of deterrence, it appears that 
his comments are only linking the acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment to the 
goal of specific deterrence. When a particular offender suffers extra-curial punishment 
                                                 
56 Ibid [25]. This statement of principle has subsequently been relied upon by the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of Jehad Jodeh v R [2011] NSWCCA 194. 
57 Edney and Bagaric, above n 19, 7. 
58 Andrew Von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth ‘Deterrence’ in Andrew Von Hirsch and Andrew 
Ashworth (eds), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (Hart Publishing, 1998) 
44, 44. 
59 R v Hannigan [2009] QCA 40 at [25]. 
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during or after the commission of a crime, it is difficult to see how that punishment 
would deter other offenders from committing a similar crime. If offenders believe that 
they are clever enough to commit a crime, they arguably also believe that they are 
smart enough to avoid any extra-curial punishment that might flow from that crime. In 
any event, were they to be unlucky enough to accidentally injure themselves or to 
become the victim of a revenge attack, these would be factors that could mitigate their 
sentence. Richard Posner’s economic analysis of criminal offending suggests that 
‘people make calculations about losses and gains when deciding whether or not to 
carry out a crime’.60 It is suggested that a rational agent will not be deterred by the 
extra-curial punishment suffered by an unrelated offender. If anything, the 
acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor runs in opposition to 
the goal of general deterrence. The rational offender may be more inclined to ‘roll the 
dice’ and chance a criminal endeavour, knowing that any serious loss or detriment they 
suffer in the commission of their crime may mitigate their ultimate sentence. 
Second, it is acknowledged that if a particular offender does suffer serious loss or 
detriment as a result of committing a crime, this may indeed achieve the goal of 
specific deterrence. If an offender is left with a disability or other serious affliction, 
they may no longer possess the physical ability to re-offend, let alone the mental desire 
to do so. Such a result, however, is not without its moral difficulties. It is one thing to 
acknowledge that extra-curial punishment has resulted in an offender becoming 
disabled. It is another thing to suggest that the imposition of this disability is consistent 
with achieving a valid sentencing aim enshrined in legislation. The moral ambiguity 
that flows from the acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment is discussed further 
below. 
 
B  Extra-Curial Punishment and the Sentencing aim of Retribution 
 
Theories of retribution assert that an offender deserves to suffer and that the 
institution of punishment should inflict the suffering an offender deserves.61 A 
characteristic of retributive theory is that the ‘punishment must be equivalent to the 
level of wrong doing’.62 Extra-curial punishment cannot guarantee any level of 
proportionality between punishment and the seriousness of the offence. Allowing 
victims of crime to influence the form of punishment given to an offender can lead to 
inconsistency and injustice. 
 
Whilst theories of retributivism had previously fallen from favour due to their 
perceived connection with ‘archaic and reactionary feelings of revenge’,63 the last 30 
years have witnessed a ‘revival of retributivist ideas under the guise of “just 
deserts”’.64 The sentencing aim of just punishment65 (or just deserts) holds that an 
individual offender should only be punished as severely as they deserve.66 Findlay 
suggests that this aim of punishment ‘relies on the potential to calculate and compare 
                                                 
60 Richard Posner, ‘An Economic Theory of Law’ (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 1193 as 
referred to in Heather Douglas and Sue Harbidge, Criminal Process in Queensland (1st ed, 2008) 
247. 
61 Edney and Bagaric, above n 19, 9. 
62 Ibid 3. 
63 Eamonn Carrabine et al, Criminology A Sociological Introduction (1st ed, 2004) 235. 
64 Ibid 235. 
65 As it is referred to in section 9(1)(a) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). 
66 Carrabine et al, above n 64, 236. 
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proportionality in punishment with the harm caused by the crime’.67 The 
acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor is poorly compatible 
with these aims. Extra-curial punishment is inherently unpredictable … we simply 
cannot predict what form it might take and how serious it might be. An offender might 
be badly hurt in the commission of a crime. An offender might be viciously assaulted 
in a revenge attack. There is nothing that prevents extra-curial punishment from being 
a far more severe sanction than what would otherwise be warranted in the 
circumstances. There can be no safeguards put in place to ensure that extra-curial 
punishment is proportionate to the harm caused by the crime. If the acknowledgment 
of extra-curial punishment has the potential to compromise just punishment (an 
offender receives more or less than their just deserts), if its acknowledgment 
compromises the notion of proportionality in sentencing and if its acknowledgment 
compromises consistency in the sentencing process, then we have to question whether 
the ends or purposes of retribution are really being achieved. 
 
C  Extra-Curial punishment and the Moral Justification 
 
The above arguments that relate to proportionality and just deserts suggest that 
the only concern with extra-curial punishment is its propensity to conflict with some of 
the fundamental tenets of retributivism. They say nothing about the moral quandary 
involved in acknowledging that the physical injury of an offender can achieve a valid 
sentencing end. The act of sentencing requires a moral justification because it involves 
the intentional infliction of harm upon an individual.68 Zimring and Hawkins contend: 
 
The need to justify punishment is reflected in moral logic as well as history. Since 
penal practices are by definition unpleasant, the world is a poorer place for their 
presence unless the positive functions achieved by them outweigh the negative 
elements inherent in the politics.69 
 
This need for moral justification is heightened ten-fold when the courts are 
dealing with extra-curial punishment. The Australian government, legislature and 
judiciary have long acknowledged that corporal punishment is an inhumane way to 
punish an individual. Foucault notes that ‘[p]hysical pain, the pain of the body itself is 
no longer the constituent element of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable 
sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights’.70 No power 
exists for an Australian court to hand down a sanction that involves the physical 
infliction of pain or injury to an offender. Yet, if an offender sustains ‘serious loss or 
detriment’ during the commission of their crime, or as a result of a revenge attack, 
Australian courts are prepared to acknowledge that these injuries achieve a valid 
sentencing end. It is almost as if the courts are saying ‘we will not physically punish 
you ourselves, but if somebody else decides to, we are happy to recognise that as a 
valid form of punishment’. At best, this represents a moral inconsistency that has yet to 
be fully justified. At worst, a court’s acknowledgment that extra-curial punishment 
achieves a desired sentencing goal equates to an implicit sanctioning of corporal 
punishment. 
                                                 
67 M Findlay, Criminal Law: Problems in Context (2nd ed, 2006) 386. 
68 Edney and Bagaric, above n 19, 7. 
69 F E Zimring and G Hawkins, Incapacitation: Penal Confinement and Restraint of Crime 
(Oxford University Press, 1995) 5. 
70 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of Prison (1977) 11. 
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V  SHOULD EXTRA-CURIAL PUNISHMENT BE ACKNOWLEDGED AT ALL? 
 
If there is difficulty in justifying the acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment 
under the heading of retribution or deterrence, then one option available to the courts is 
to stop acknowledging it as a mitigating factor. The position might be that if an 
offender is prepared to commit a crime, then they need to accept all of the risks that are 
attendant upon the commission of that crime. If an offender suffers serious loss or 
detriment due to some form of accident or misadventure, then it is the offender’s own 
fault for putting himself or herself in a position of risk or danger. If an offender suffers 
some form of revenge attack, then that is a consequence that the offender has to deal 
with. It is certainly not unforeseeable that a victim (or acquaintance of a victim) might 
fight back when criminal behaviour is directed towards them. There is some attraction 
to this approach; if you are prepared to commit a crime, then you need to accept the 
consequences of committing that crime, even if those consequences are quite 
unpleasant. 
Despite the appeal of this approach, it is contended that there are some 
circumstances where it would simply be unjust to ignore the extra-curial punishment 
suffered by an offender. This would particularly be the case where the injury suffered 
by an offender is completely disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime 
committed. The view might be that an offender has already suffered enough. Brennan J 
in Channon v R71 stated that ‘severity in sentencing is tempered by society’s respect for 
the liberty and physical integrity of the offender and the weight given to these values 
frequently and inevitably limits the achievement of the ends of sentencing’.72  
There is no doubt that the acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment as a 
mitigating factor frustrates some of the aims and purposes of sentencing, rather than 
aiding them. It has been argued above that acknowledging extra-curial punishment as 
achieving a valid sentencing end opens the courts to criticisms of moral inconsistency 
and ambiguity. This article suggests that the acknowledgment of extra-curial 
punishment cannot be justified under headings of retribution or deterrence – but it can 
be justified under principles of mercy. Windeyer J in Cobiac v Liddy73 emphasised the 
importance of mercy to the sentencing process when his Honour stated: 
 
The whole history of criminal justice has shewn that severity of punishment begets the 
need of a capacity for mercy … This is not because mercy, in Portia’s74 sense should 
season justice. It is that a capacity in special circumstances to avoid the rigidity of 
inexorable law is of the very essence of justice.75 
 
                                                 
71 (1978) 33 FLR 433 
72 Ibid 438. 
73 (1969) 119 CLR 257. 
74 When referring to Portia in the context of mercy, Windeyer J is making reference to Portia the 
heroine of William Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. Portia delivers a courtroom speech 
espousing the virtue of mercy in Act 4 Scene 1: 
‘The quality of mercy is not strain'd. 
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven 
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest: 
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.’ 
75 (1969) 119 CLR 257, 269 (Windeyer J). 
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The recognition of extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor, underpinned by 
the tenets of mercy, permits values such as grace, compassion and understanding to 
play a role in the sentencing of offenders who have suffered serious loss or detriment.76 
Unlike most other mitigating factors, mercy is never ‘owed to a defender as of right, 
nor are there recognised grounds for its existence, but its existence cannot be denied by 
the sentencer when invited to be merciful’.77 Such an approach would not promote 
corporal punishment as achieving a valid sentencing end. It would simply acknowledge 
that corporal punishment had occurred. It would allow a court to weigh up the 
seriousness of the offending with the seriousness of the extra-curial punishment 
suffered. Such an approach would not mitigate an offender’s sentence as of right, even 
if he or she had suffered serious loss or detriment. Indeed, such an approach may even 
have seen child sex offender Shane Thomas Davidson serve his time in prison (instead 
of in the community) despite the fact that he was seriously assaulted by the victim’s 
father. 
 
 
VI  CONCLUSION 
 
Sentencing an offender who has been injured during or after the commission of an 
offence is a difficult procedure. Emotion colours the entire exercise, and it can be 
difficult to know whether empathy should lie with the victim or the perpetrator of the 
crime. This article has suggested that there is a theoretical disconnect between the 
acknowledgment of extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor and the purposes or 
goals of punishment that guide the sentencing process. It is acknowledged that ‘without 
proper calibration between the offence, the offender and the object of the sentencing 
process, injustice is likely to result’.78 The current theoretical rationales (deterrence and 
retribution) supporting extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor create practical 
difficulties and moral concerns that have yet to be judicially canvassed.79 Rather than 
abandon extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor on sentence, we should seek to 
justify its recognition through a more humane and principled approach; the principle of 
mercy. There is merit in constantly reassessing the reasons for, and the extent to which, 
we punish individuals who break the law. To borrow the poetic words of Sir Winston 
Churchill: 
 
A calm and dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused against the state, and 
even of convicted criminals against the state, a constant heart-searching by all charged 
with the duty of punishment, a desire and eagerness to rehabilitate in the world of 
industry all those who have paid their dues in the hard coinage of punishment, tireless 
efforts towards the discovery of curative and regenerating processes, and an 
unfaltering faith that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of every 
man. These are the symbols which in the treatment of crime and criminals mark and 
measure the stored-up strength of a nation, and are the sign and proof of the living 
virtue in it.80 
                                                 
76 Edney and Bagaric, above n 19, 149. 
77 Fox and Freiberg, above n 26, 232. 
78 Edney and Bagaric, above n 19, 7. 
79 This is despite the fact that extra-curial punishment as a mitigating factor has continued to be 
acknowledged by Australian courts … the most recent examples being Fernando v Balchin 
[2011] NTSC 10 and Jehad Jodeh v R [2011] NSWCCA 194. 
80 Sir Winston Churchill, (Speech delivered in the House of Commons as Home Secretary, July 
20 1910). 
